

THE HISTORY

OF THE Negotiations

Treaty of Peace

FROM
The Breaking off of the Conference
at Gertrudeberg, to the End of those

CONSIDERED
In a Fourth Letter

to a Tory-Member

OF THE
Parliament of Great-Britain
in the Year 1711

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HISTORICAL

*** Jan. 10. 1711.

SIR

I Fear you begin to wish you had kept your De-
 to your self, and not ask'd my Opinion upon Ma-
 ters that have grown under my Pen so much bey-
 the compass, which I at first hop'd they wou'd be
 come within your patience once more, and this shall
 the last time I will trouble you with my Thoughts up-
 the Management either of War or Peace, till you
 again make it your own Request, to whom I can re-
 nothing. To come then to the Business, and resume
 Subject where my last left off; I shall give you in
 the best Account I can, of what was done in relation
 Peace. from the breaking off of the Conferences at
Hague, to the end of those that were held the Year
 at *Gertruydenberg*; that is, from June the 9th 1710
 to July the 25th 1710. And that you may have a
 distinct View of this Affair, I shall not be loath to
 divide this Space of Time into three Parts; and con-
 First, what pass'd from the Return of Monsieur Ro-
 to Monsieur *Petkue*'s Journey to *Paris*, which was ab-
 the middle of November. Secondly, what Progress
 made in this Affair, between that Journey and the
 rival of the Marquis *de Ouxelles* and the Abbe *de Polignac*
 the French Plenipotentiaries, at *Gertruydenberg*: And
 give you in the Third place, some Account of the
 negotiations during their stay there; since which no
 vances have been made on either side in this grand
 fair.

First, For what pass'd between the Conferences at
Hague, and Monsieur *Petkue*'s Journey to *Paris*, you know
 without my telling you, that the Negotiations did
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directly deal'd with these Conferences, but were still
 at home, and carry'd on by an intercourse of Letters,
 between Monsieur *Beaumont* and the Marquis de *Tercy*; to
 if an Expedient cou'd be found out for the 3rd Ar-
 ticle, the Difficulty in that Article being the only Point
 which the Conference, in appearance at least, were
 to settle. The Point they offer'd to satisfy the Allies in
 that the King of *Spain* should not directly nor in-
 directly assist his Grandson. You will easily judge of the
 importance of this Point, by what I have said in my last
 letter, and by what follows, that the recovery of *Spain* and
Italy depends entirely upon it. For if the King of
France supports the Duke of *Anjou*, all the Efforts the
 Allies can make against him, will be to no purpose, since
 he can send more Men and Money to *Spain* in a
 Year, than they can do in a Twelvemonth; but if the
 King of *France* will in good earnest withdraw all As-
 sistance from him, then a Spanish War would be but a
 trifling Business, since in that Case, there can be no doubt,
 that in a little time the Duke of *Anjou* would be content
 to give the *Spaniards*; or they at least would find it for
 their Interest to leave him. Now, the more important this
 is, the more are the others concerned to insist upon
 ancient Security, not to be deceived, and all that
 pass hitherto on the Part of *France*, either in former
 Treaties, or in the last Conferences, give them but too
 reason to think, they can never be cautious enough,
 they trust so perfidious a Prince in an Affair of so much
 consequence. And if you carry these Views with you
 your Thoughts upon this Subject, you can easily take
 with their foolish and groundless Insinuations, who
 have perswade you, that the Allies have been so diffi-
 dent. As to the Expedients propos'd to secure this Point,
 went upon the same Foot with that which Monsieur
 had propos'd, as from himself, the Day before
 Monsieur *Kenne* left the Hague. That three Towns should
 be put into the Hands of the Allies, to be restor'd to
 him, when the Affair of *Spain* should be decided.
 was the nature of the Expedient in question; and
 it is plain how better this Readiness of the Allies to
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put an End to the War, and the sincerity of France, the
 what past between them upon this Subject. The Town
 to be given up for this purpose, must have been either
 Spain, or on the Borders of it, or on the side of
 or in Flanders. Whatever could have been done of
 kind, was but a poor Expedient for an Article of
 much Consequence; and had the King of France been
 Earnest, one can't think he would have made any pro-
 ty to give the Allies what they were willing to accept.
 But as he meant nothing less, than what he was
 ward to promise, there was no Security of this sort.
 Allies could ask, which he did not think too much
 grant.

As for Towns in Spain, which was the last Security
 and most to the purpose, that Expedient had been
 pos'd as I told you in my last, during the Conference
 the Hague, and was by the French Ministers refus'd;
 to prevent the Allies from persisting in this Demand.
 King soon after put it out of his power to comply
 it; otherwise his people, as blind as they are, could
 have had any great opinion of his Sincerity in the
 fires he express'd for Peace, while he rejected a Co-
 tion that was so natural for the Allies to ask, and
 only possible, but easy for him to grant; and which
 Safety and Interest of France, as distinct from Spain,
 no way concern'd in. That the Negotiations there
 might not continue to rest upon this Point, he took
 immediately, that there should be no room left for
 Allies to insist on this Demand; and to that end
 drew his Troops out of all the Spanish Fortresses,
 did afterwards out of the Kingdom, upon pretence
 deed, of evacuating Spain according to the Preliminary
 Articles. But that was only a Pretence; for he kept
 there all the Summer, to be at hand to assist the
 Aragon in case his Army should be attack'd, or an In-
 should be made into Aragon; that otherwise the Ge-
 ral that commanded them, had Orders not to venture
 Battle, but to be on the defensive, as appears upon
 Duke of ~~Albuquerque~~ coming to his Army upon the Sub-
 of Balaguer by the Allies, and expostulating with

al Bezons for not joining upon that Occasion the *Spanish* Army; for which he justify'd himself, by producing the King's Orders. By this middle way the King thought he would deceive the Allies, without abandoning the *Spaniards*: and in the mean time, the Duke of *Anjou*, according to the Direction of *French* Councils, made his utmost Efforts to put *Spain* into a Condition to defend it self, as if they were in earnest to expect no farther Assistance from *France*: which had so good an Effect on the *Spaniards*, that they exerted themselves beyond what would be expected of them: They compleated in a little time their old Regiments, and rais'd besides a great many new ones; and the most vigorous Measures were taken to raise Money, and erect Magazines, as if they were to stand, for the future, on their own Bottom; tho' the King of *France* was far from intending they should want ASSISTANCE, when their AFFAIRS call'd for it. And that his Grandson might not want a General for his Army, 'twas publicly talk'd at *Paris*, before Monsieur *Rouille's* Return, that in case of a Peace, the Duke of *Bermick* had desir'd Leave to resign his *Baton* of *Marshal of France*, that he might go and command in *Spain*: Which shews us how the Duke of *Anjou* might have Officers as well as Men from *France*, if he had any want of them.

If therefore the King of *France* withdrew his Troops, was not with a Design to leave his Grandson to himself, but upon very different Views; 'twas to make the Allies and his own People believe he was sincere, and that he was willing to remove, as far as he could, all Difficulties in the way to Peace; and yet, at the same Time, and by the same Action, increase the Difficulties he would seem to remove, by rendering by this means, the most reasonable Demand of the Allies impracticable: besides that he really wanted these Troops himself, against another Year: the Danger he was threaten'd with in *Flanders*, obliging him to have a more numerous Army on that side. This was really meant, by withdrawing his Troops from *Spain*; and therefore he did not do it, till he had put the Duke of *Anjou's* Affairs upon a pretty good Foot,

and

and he was sure, there cou'd be no immediate Want of them, the Campaign there being at an end. And that this Removal of his Troops might be of the least Prejudice possible to his Grandson, he contriv'd that as many of his own Troops shou'd desert, as wou'd make seven or eight Battalions; and to supply the place of the rest, far he cou'd, he sent his Grandson all the Walloon Regiments from Flanders; from whence they began the March for Spain the beginning of the February following, which was as soon as Money, Arms and Cloaths cou'd be provided for them. And not content with giving the Duke of Anjou this Assistance, and supplying him with great Stores of Ammunition; because new raised Troops cou'd not be much depended on, the King kept many of the Troops he withdrew in Roussillon upon the Borders of Spain, to be ready to return, when his Grandson's Affairs shou'd make it necessary. And is not this very like the Conduct of one, who means in earnest to abandon Spain, and wou'd restore it to the House of Austria, if he cou'd? but poor Man, he can't do Impossible things. 'Tis a pretty way to facilitate the Reduction of a Kingdom, to make it as Difficult as possible; a great sign of Sincerity to put things out of our Power, which we can't without discovering our Insincerity keep in it, and might be reasonable to create Impossible things, and the complaint of them. Who can help believing, such a Man when he tells you, he wou'd with all his Heart, to procure a Peace, give up the Spanish Monarchy, if he cou'd, but that he really can't, and that this is the only hindrance? Or what Pledge of his Good-will is there, or may not expect from him, as a Caution, that he won't directly or indirectly hinder your doing, what he can possibly himself do for you? To expect a valuable Pledge from a Man, to be return'd to him when that is done, which he intends never shall be done; is a great Mistake. And therefore since the French King has so plainly discover'd this Intention, you must not be wonder he makes these Difficulties in telling an Expedient, as you cou'd not expect in a Man who means, one word of what he says.

The first and only good Expedition you see, it made
 practicable, on purpose that it may not be insisted on
 next best way to put into the Hands of the Allies
 the French Towns on the Frontier of Spain, such as
 Perpignan, which would have enabled the
 King to send Forces to Spain with infinitely less Expence
 and Trouble, and in a quarter of the time they can now
 at the same time have oblig'd the Fr. party effectu-
 ally to keep their Promise, not to assist the Duke of An-
 jou, by cutting off in great measure the Communication
 between France and Spain. This was an Expedition which
 the King could not say he was not in his Power to com-
 mit, with ; but when one has not a mind to do a thing, no-
 thing is so easy as to find out a reason for not doing it.
 This could not be said to be an impossible Expedition,
 as easy to pretend, that it did not just either with the
 Liberty or Dignity of France to put the Keys of this King-
 dom into the Hands of the Allies, since he could not
 assure what use they might make of them, or what he
 could get them again. And this was very right argu-
 ment for a Man who never intended that should be done,
 which is made the Condition, on which the Condition he
 offers shall be restor'd. If the King does not design
 to be quitted by his Grandson, it must be so, and
 would not be very prudent in him to give the Allies
 so important Places under the Notion of a Cessionary
 Treaty, which must either defeat his Design, or support
 his Grandson, or if that Design succeed, you'd never
 be able to demand back of them: nor but that a Prince
 of his known abilities would, we may be sure, soon find
 a Pretence to ask for them, and that Pretence he would
 easily, if not readily submitted to, the same way he has
 many others no less groundless, by Force and Arms,
 which with him have always been the Measures of Right
 and Wrong. But, if he were sincere, if he really meant
 to restore Spain, should he not restor'd, what Inconvenience should
 be in complying with this Expedition? What ill
 could the Allies make of it? Could they by the Help
 of these Towns hurt France, before they had reduc'd Spain?
 It is to be imagin'd that would not find them short enough.

Or is there any room to fear an Invasion from Spain
 towards? No sure, however significant Spain may be in
 Hands, it won't in haste be very formidable but of them
 they would have too much Business in looking to the
 selves, to think of disturbing so powerful a Neighbor
 and there would be a thousand times more Reason
 them to be afraid of France, than for France to apprehend
 any thing from them. Nor can there be the least Pretence
 for a Suspicion, that the Allies, if these Towns were
 in their Hands, would never part with them: I suppose
 the End answer'd, for which they were entrusted with
 them: for, besides that such a Breach of faith is without
 Example on the Side of the Allies, they can't for
 Reasons I gave you in my last, act a false part in
 matter, if they would, especially not on this Side of France
 where, if the Allies had ever so much Justice on the
 Side, they cou'd not long support themselves under
 mighty Disadvantages with which they must make
 on this Frontier; of which you may judge by what I have
 said in my first Letter of the Spanish War, which, with
 little Alteration, will hold here.

But there is no need of saying more, to show you how
 culous 'tis to pretend any Fears of the Allies, if these Towns
 should be put into their Hands; the supporting of Spain has
 France too dear, not to know the low Condition it is in,
 that nothing cou'd be greater madness in King Charles or
 Allies, than not to sit down quietly in peace the Minute
 Kingdom is reduc'd to his Obedience, without seeking for
 Pretences to continue the War needlessly.

Nothing therefore can be thought to be the true Reason,
 the King of France rejected this Expedient, but that he
 ver intended the Allies should obtain the End for which
 was ask'd; as you will still see more plainly in what follows.
 On the Side of Alsace, nothing was propos'd that I know
 but Thionville, a place of great Consequence to France,
 they in any Danger from the Empire; but considering the
 ble low Condition of that enervated/exhausted Body, one
 but think the strong Places on that Side, are of no other
 use to enable the French to invade the Empire, and not to
 sure 'em against Invasions from it. And what should be

only as a Pledge, would be to be restor'd, long before the
 Empire could be in a Condition to make any use of it, that
 would be either unjust in it self, or troublesome to France: But
 France never intending to fulfil the Condition on which the
 cession should be restor'd, the Proposal was rejected upon the
 one Pretence or the former.
 Nothing now was left, but to seek for an expedient in
 themselves, which was what the French offer'd
 on the first, and all along press'd, as if they were very
 much in earnest: But had they been so, 'tis very hard to
 see a good Reason, why an Expedient should be look'd
 for here, rather than in any other part. The Allies, tho'
 they were sensible whatever could be given on this Side,
 was but a poor Expedient at best; yet they were so sin-
 cerely dispos'd to put an end to the War, that they would
 not absolutely reject it. Whatever Towns France could
 give into the Hands of the Allies on this Side, if they
 were not such as lie nearest to those that are to be given
 by the Preliminarys, their Tenure would be very
 precarious, and it would be very difficult to keep them
 when France had a mind to have them again. This
 may easily judge of, by the Impossibility the Allies
 were under last Campaign to make the Siege of Arras,
 while they left Douay behind them; and the Difficulty
 they gave them in the Siege of Aire. But if these
 stationary Towns were to be of those that lie nearest,
 they could not be of so much Importance to France, as
 they should not be willing to part with them to keep
 gain, since this would only be making a little farther
 addition to the Barrier of the Netherlands, as I hinted
 my last; which would secure them more from France,
 than as bad an Equivalent as this was at the best. The
 French refus'd to make it as good as they could, by ex-
 changing some Towns which were of most Consequence,
 such as Douay, Arras, and Cambray; which would lay
 them open to an Invasion from the Allies: which, if the
 Allies were able to make, they knew their own Designs
 would give but too just a Handle for; besides, they were
 willing to part with them under the name of a Cession,
 that they could not be willing to part with for good and

(92)
all; since they intended to forfeit the Condition and do themselves, or rather not suffer that to be done which would give them a right to ask for it again.

This being the Design of France, all these Negotiations by Letters, came to nothing; and one Side would not offer what the other could accept, unless the Allies would be content with the name of an Expedient, instead of a Thing; and have taken that for a Security, which they were before-hand sure, could by no means answer the End 'twas given for: which the Allies were too wise to do; and had they done otherwise, which is so foolish supposition, I don't well know how to make it, had been agreed to put into the Hands of the Dutch the cautionary Towns, over and above those that they are to have by the Preliminaries, would it have pleas'd the Generals, who are so angry that a Peace is not yet made? Would they not have been the forwardest to shew the Insufficiency of such an Expedient? Would they not, from the evident Folly of it, have readily argued, it was the Effect not of Folly but of Treachery? Would it not have been said, that Spain and the Indies were given up in Compliment to the Dutch, that they might have a better Frontier? Would not some body have been censur'd as a Follower of the Dutch too, for agreeing to so Scandalous an Expedient, for an Article of so much Importance? Would not Embassies have been employ'd in Holland and France, to learn if there were not some secret Whisper at least, of a private Correspondence carry'd on by a Gentleman, for facilitating the way to a Peace so much to the mind both of France and the States? from what is now doing of this kind, we may be very sure what would have been done; and the foolish Frenchify'd, and Dutch Politicks of some Men, which if they prevail, at some time or other, infallibly prove the Ruin of this Nation, leave no room to doubt, but that if Spain must lose, they had rather lose it without this Expedient, than with it, if Holland is to be the better for it. This is plain, that I shall say no more to vindicate the Allies from this Head, which I shall end with observing, that the French did not only trifle with the Allies, in offering dangerous Expedients; but sometimes did it in terms pre-

evident

idently when they saw Monsieur Killar, cou'd not be at-
 tacked in his strong Camp near Douay, and were in hopes
 the Allies cou'd do nothing more on that side but take
 away, and had no Hears from any other Quarter. Nay,
 the Infidelity they affect'd to continue even after the
 feat of Flanders, which because 'twas short of those they
 before receiv'd, and their Men were so hem'd in with
 trenchments, that they cou'd not run away. if they
 cou'd, they wou'd have it thought a sort of Vi-
 cory, and a Sign that the French Courage was at last re-
 stor'd by Villars, which Vendôme had in vain attempted,
 and fetch'd from loss an purpose for that great Work:
 which had then no other effect on the Kings Affairs, but
 to ruin them in one part, without mending them in the
 other. But now it seems the Business is done, and the
 Courage is restor'd; and had the Dutch been as ready
 to believe what the French said of that Battle, as some
 of the People have been since to credit the Accounts they
 give of what pass'd in the late Treaty, they had certainly
 been frighten'd into Peace upon their Terms (any Ex-
 pedient or no Expedient it had been all one, they wou'd
 have accepted without Difficulty so much of the Prelimi-
 naries, as the Marquis de Luxe wou'd have left them.
 The Dutch knew better the Ground they stood
 on; they know the Accounts of their Friends were to
 be depended on; but that the Reports of the Enemy de-
 serv'd no Credit, whose Affairs put them under the ne-
 cessity of misrepresenting the true State of things;
 and they have long pass'd in great Perfection, and
 sometimes with no little Success. This made the States
 go to their point, and not recede an inch from what
 they insist'd on; which for some time occasion'd a stop
 in the Negotiations, the French not knowing how to pre-
 scribe their own Expedient, or to accept theirs, since they were
 oblig'd to propose no good one, and all ones wou'd not
 be receiv'd; and they found themselves more puzzled by
 the Reduction of Mons, which was a plain Declaration to
 the World, that the Advantage as well as Honour of
 the Dutch was altogether on the side of the Allies. These
 successes of the Campaign, in which the Allies had taken

the strongest Fortress in Europe, and another not much inferior to it, and had gain'd under the greatest Disadvantages one of the most obstinate Battles that were ever fought, gave the French reason to think they would rather rise than fall in their Demands, and made them for a while affect to stand off, and the course of Letters with Monsieur Petkum seem'd to be an End: but this Humour, as it was affect'd, so it was not last.

After some time, the Marquiss de Torcy wrote to Monsieur Petkum to desire, since the Point in dispute could not be adjust'd by Letters, that Passes might be given for some Ministers from France to come to Holland, to renew the Conferences, or that Monsieur Petkum might be permitted to go to France, to try if his Presence could help to find out an Expedient, that had hitherto been in vain endeavour'd by Letters. The first the States refus'd, till they knew precisely what they were to come for; since under the appearance of some good, the Presence of French Ministers in Holland gave them an opportunity to do a great deal of harm, by sowing seeds of Jealousy among the Allies, poisoning the Minds of the People against their Governours, and retarding the Preparations for another Campaign, which can never be push'd with the Vigour they shou'd, while People are amus'd with the specious Appearances of an approaching certain Peace. For so the French endeavour'd to make it every where thought, when they meant nothing. For these Reasons the States refus'd to give Passes for any Ministers to come from France, till they knew more of their Intentions. But to shew their readiness to bearken to any reasonable Proposal, they consented Monsieur Petkum shou'd go to France, which he did about the latter End of November.

But before I give you an Account of that Journey, you must acquaint you, that while their Negotiations were carrying on by Letters with France, the Duke of Anjou did not only take all the proper Measures he would to maintain himself in the Monarchy, which his Grandfather was in appearance creating to give up, but publish'd

able Manifesto the beginning of July, wherein he
 protests against all that should be transacted at the Hague
 his prejudice, as void and null, and declares his
 resolution to adhere to his faithful Spaniards; as long
 there is a Man of them will stand by him: and is so
 from quitting Spain and the Indies to his Competi-
 tion, that he won't consent he should have those parts of
 the Monarchy which he was then possess'd of; and in
 consequence of this Manifesto, he names the Duke d'Alba
 and Count Bergheyck for his Plenipotentiaries, with or-
 ders to notify it to the Maritime Powers, which Count
 Bergheyck did, in a Letter to the Duke of M—— da-
 ted from Mons. August the 21st, with a Copy of their
 instructions, and they sent another at the same time to
 the Deputy of the States, which were accordingly trans-
 mitted to their Principals: but no Answer was thought
 either by England or Holland to be return'd to them:
 and to admit Plenipotentiaries from him now, wou'd
 undo all that had been hitherto agreed on; and instead
 of seeking for an Expedient for one Article of the Pre-
 minaries, the whole of them wou'd have been
 destroy'd, and the T R E A T Y must have been begun
 afresh. This wou'd have been the Consequence
 of admitting Ministers from the Duke of Anjou; and
 was this we shall see afterwards the French aim'd at.
 But I can't leave this Head, without observing to you,
 that in Count Bergheyck's Letter there were broad Insi-
 nuations, how grateful the Duke of Anjou wou'd be, if
 by mean of his Grace's good Offices, his just and reasona-
 ble Desires might be comply'd with: There was nothing
 he wou'd not do to content England in general, or that
 might be to his Grace's Satisfaction in particular. I have
 likewise heard from good Hands, that Monsieur Torcy
 had very unnecessarily, and with great Officiousness, writ
 two or three very civil Letters to his Grace; till he
 found his Civilities were lost upon him. They were
 both mistaken in their Man, if they thought any thing
 wou'd tempt him to go into any secret Measures against
 the Interest of his Country, and the Good of the com-
 mon Cause. But these Ministers have both of them had
 enough Experience of the Power of Corruption else-
 where

where, not to be excusable for trying it here, when
was so much for the Service of their Masters. And the
not succeeding here, has not, I believe, deter'd them
from trying their Skill, where they may succeed better.

If the D. of M. govern'd himself with respect to Peace
by private Views; there is, I think, no doubt, but he
is to be got a great deal, by agreeing to the Terms
France, than he can ever hope for by refusing them: And
I believe one may safely say, no Ministers was
gratify'd for making a good Peace, tho' many have been
well paid for persuading their Masters into ill ones.

But to return to Monsieur Perckum, and his Journey
Paris, which the States consented to, not from any
they expected from it, but to prevent the ill Ule the
militarys of France wou'd make of their refusing it.
After a stay there of about ten Days, and several fruitless
Interviews with the Marquis de Torcy, he return'd
the Hague, Decemb. 7. without having been able to make
the least Progress in the Business he went on, or bring-
ing so much as the Pretence of an Expedient along with
him: But instead of that, he brought the Sense of the
French Court in a Paper drawn up by Monsieur Torcy,
which has made so publick, that I can't but presume you
have seen it, and must remember, that the Substance of
was to this effect: That the Design of the Preliminary
Articles being to prevent, if possible, the Campaign of 1713,
was then drawing on; since that Effect cou'd not be
obtain'd, the reason of them was now ceas'd, together
with the King's Obligation to agree to them, since they
were not accepted within the Time limited: but that
the Allies wou'd, the King was willing the Winter should
be employ'd in treating definitively of Peace; and that
suppressing the Form of those Articles, he wou'd present
the Substance of them, and on the Foundation of the Con-
cessions therein made to the Allies, he wou'd consent
to resume the Negotiations, to commence from the first
January following; and that the Execution of the Arti-
cles shou'd, as is usual in all Treatys, begin from the
time of their Ratification. This was the Answer Mon-
sieur Perckum brought, which was short even of their Expecta-

ons who hop'd for least from it: for this overthrew all
the Preliminaries at once, while the King pretended to
agree to all but one; and by promising to keep the Sub-
stance of them, while they destroy the Form, they effectu-
ally defeat all that had been done, and recover to them-
selves an entire liberty to dispute all Points afresh, and
lay hold of all the Occasions which that wou'd give
them to create Divisions and jealousys between the States
and their Allies, which is plainly the great Point they
have all along aim'd at: which tho they have been so ter-
ribly disappointed in, they are now willing to give over,
and hopes their Constancy and Firmness to the common
Cause wou'd in time be weary'd out, and yield to the
fortunate Solicitations with which they tempted them.
Tho' to prevent a new Campaign might be a reason for dis-
missing the Preliminaries, 'twas not the only or chief Design of
them. Whenever a Treaty shou'd commence, the Allies had de-
termin'd long before, in answer to the Elector of Bavaria's Let-
ter at the end of the Ramillies Campaign, they wou'd not
proceed on it, 'till some fundamental Points were first settled;
the necessity of which they were convinc'd of by the dear-bought
experience of former Treaties; and the same Experience has
taught the Allies, that no Treaty with France can be effectual,
if the fundamental Articles are not executed as well as agreed
before the general Treaty is concluded: which Security the
French would entirely take away, by deferring the Execu-
tion 'till after Ratification. Thus the two great Ends of a Pre-
liminary Treaty, which are to agree on some fundamental Points,
and to secure the Execution of them, are by this Answer utterly
ruin'd; and the Allies are not only where they were before
the Treaty was begun, but are really the worse for it; it being
a greater Advantage to the French to know before hand what
the particular Demands which the Emperor and Archduke
insist on for themselves, and in behalf of the rest of
the Allies. As for solving all now by two Words, Form and Sub-
stance; two other Words, the Letter and Spirit of the Pa-
rency-Treaty, are still too well remember'd for the Allies to be
deceiv'd by French Distinctions, which if they cou'd
pass upon them, 'twou'd casu deo, that the Point of these
Articles wou'd have been found to be the Substance of them;
and

And the pretended Substance would have prov'd a Shadow only. How this Dutch-Bianches and Plain-dealing prov'd hard for the Fineness of the Fiction; a Word not more peculiar to show than the Thing meant by it. The States, having consider'd the Answer more than it deserv'd, with the Minis of the Allies, who all easily agreed in the same Opinion of it in a Resolution: they took Dec. 14. which was likewise made publick; declar'd it was not satisfactory, and resolv'd push the War with the utmost Vigour.

About the time that Mons. Petkum return'd, the King of France wrote to the Duke of Anjou, to acquaint him with what had pass'd, and assure him, that tho' he was oblig'd to recall his Troops, he need not be alarm'd at it, for that he would never abandon him; and that he had order'd Twelve of his Regiments that were in Spain, to join the Spaniards, in case King Charles should make an Irruption into Arragon. A little after Mons. Iberville was sent to Madrid; but his Journey and Business were made so great a Secret, that was not for some time known whether he was gone; and when he came to Madrid, where he arriv'd Dec. 26. his Instructions were to communicate his Business to no body but the King himself. He did not make a long stay, nor was his appearance well receiv'd; but no judgment cou'd be made from thence what his Errand was: there was no way to distinguish between what was real and what disguise.

But to judge from other Steps, 'tis most reasonable to think his Business was to learn the State the Duke's Affairs were in, and give him his Lesson, how he should manage so nice a Furniture, with Assurance, that in spite of all appearances to the contrary, which the necessity of his Affairs might oblige the King to make, he would never desert him, nor least agree with the Allies upon any terms to turn his Arms against him. But this Journey was made a great Mystry, to make the Allies believe, the Business of it was to persuade the Duke of Anjou to retire out of Spain, since it would be impossible for the King to support him any longer. If this King were not a perfect Master in all the Arts and Methods of War, as great an Enemy as he is, I should be almost tempted to pity him, to see how hard a Game he has to play. He has deal with two Parties, one of which must be oppos'd on

yet the Spaniards be will assist and support his Grandson,
 what it will; and at the same time he promises most so-
 ly the Allies, that he will not give the least Assistance to
 directly or indirectly. Now if he can find Credit with both
 Parties, either he is a very cunning Man, or one of them are
 great Fools. In the present Case I shoud suspect the last,
 the Allies could be thus impos'd on: for if we consider which
 is, both by Nature and Interest, he is most inclin'd to, or
 how his Actions to be a better proof of his Meaning than his
 Words, there is no room to doubt but the Allies are the Party he
 wou'd deceive if he cou'd; since 'tis evident from what I have
 already said in the beginning of this Letter, he has ever since
 Conferences at the Hague broke off been doing all he cou'd
 the Service of his Grandson, that he may be able to sup-
 port himself without any visible Assistance from France, till
 Affairs are so far retriev'd, as not to make any Manage-
 ments doing is longer necessary. But all the Inference I
 cou'd as present make from this is, that since the Spaniards
 shoud be deceiv'd, if we are not, or we must, if they are not
 Words or Promises, be they ever so fair shoud weigh with
 or be thought as Arguments of his Sincerity, unless his Ac-
 tions go along with them.
 But to return to the Negotiations, after the Paper brought
 Along. Perhaps no new advances were made till the begin-
 ning of February, when an Express brought him a fresh Project
 Peace to be communicated to the Allies, which differ'd little
 from the other, or rather was an amplification of it. 'Twas
 the main the same with the Preliminaries, but cast into a
 better form, which is effectually destroy'd the Preliminaries, as
 it had been put into no form at all; besides several Altera-
 tions, for the Restoration of the Spanish Monarchy there is a
 promise only; the Clause of the 2d Article, whereby the King
 engages to take Measures with the Allies, proper measures, to o-
 blige his Grandson as he is left out; the restoring of the Two
 Sicilies, is insist'd on as a Preliminary, and of the Elector of
 Bavaria in particular to the Upper Palatinate, in contradiction
 the Preliminaries, by which 'tis agreed it should remain to
 the Elector Palatine, whom the Emperor had some time before
 put into Possession of it, than which nothing cou'd be more ren-
 derable; no Prince having suffer'd so much from France as one

of them, or defer'd so ill of the Emperor as the other. At the 37th Article, the Expedient offer'd, was Three Towns in Flanders of his own choosing: an Offer, which by what I already said, you will see is worth nothing, since he would never give any Towns that the Allies could think a tolerable security for so important a Point; besides that, if the Towns agreed on, many Difficulties would certainly rise in the Execution, and in settling the Terms on which they should remain or not; for if the Allies were to keep them only till Affairs of Spain were decided, what would they have been better for them, if in the Issue of things it should not suit their mind? which he would take the best care he could to show. I mention this, because I have seen the Condition of the Expedient so worded, or to that effect; and it is not very easy to take away all room for Equivocation, and on the other hand to give, which the Prince we are treating with, knows how to erect into a clear indisputable Right. But to complete the subject, and that the Design and End of the Preliminaries might be entirely subverted, his proposal, that the Execution of the Articles be defer'd till the Treaty be concluded, and the stipulations exchange'd. This is the noble Project that was brought to the Hague the beginning of February, and was the result of many Councils that had been held in the preceding Month. To satisfy the King's good Subjects of his sincere Desires after Peace, and as if this had been an Act of great Grace, the King, when this he not accepted, declares himself free from all Engagement; but this being in effect the same with the Paper Mons. Pezair brought, and nothing but the old Bait made up a new, the Allies were too wise to bite at it but as France had all along accepted to nothing but the 37th Article, they were resolv'd to adhere to the rest, and therefore would admit of no Conference till they explain'd themselves fully as to that Point. When the French saw so much stiffness on the Part of the Allies, who are not so religious Observers of their Word, as to suffer a little seeming Compliance to do them any harm, or to lose a point for want of it, thought fit to recede in appearance at least, and gave the States all the assurance the most express words could do, that the King agreed to all the other Preliminaries, and that if they would consent his Ministers should come to Conference with them upon the 37th Article, he did not doubt but what should be propos'd from him, would be to their Satisfaction.

This was so full a Declaration as gave some hopes. Difficulty might be adjusted, or at least it would have the refusal of what they ask'd look invidious: The States therefore, to remove all pretence of Complaint, as if they were dissident, or had a mind to prolong the War, which they saw the French were always labouring to insinuate: a Proclamation, in which their Friends bore copy after them perfectly well: granted them Passports for such Ministers, as the King should think fit to send: The Express arriv'd the 20th, and was sent back the 23d. I mention these Dates, (which at all the rest, to wit of the new Stile) to shew, how little difficulty the States made, tho' at the very time the King gave them these assurances, that all the Preliminaries should remain in full force, notwithstanding such Alterations in the Terms of the Execution as the course of time had made necessary, they knew he had just done, and would make other Alterations necessary, and would oblige them to change the Stile at least of the Preliminaries in several Articles, and that in a very material point; the thing I mean of his giving to the second Son of the Duke of Burgundy, who was born the 15th, the Title of Duke of Anjou, which was a declaration, he resolv'd to insist upon his Grandson's having the Title of King Policy, given him in the next Conferences: doubtless, tho' in appearance a little matter, would draw after it other terrible Consequences; for, if he is to retain the Title of King, he can't be imagin'd he can ever return to France with that name; matter, that would upon so many accounts be so inconvenient. Perhaps had his return thither been intended, we may be sure, the former Title would have been retain'd. If therefore, the change of King was to remain to him, it was intended a King-peace should do so too; and from thence one of these two things necessarily follow'd, either that the King of France would make one. Or Separate peace for himself, and leave the Allies to get what they cou'd; or if he agreed to a general one, it should be to suppress the Root of a partition. But these Inferences, as natural as they were, did not hinder the States to grant the passage at last, and to do every thing they could to facilitate the way to a good Peace.

In this short Account of what pass'd from Mons. Perikun's Journal, which came to Paris to this time, that is from the latter end of November to the beginning of March, leaves but little room to express much from the said Conferences; the Affair having in this

this interval not at all advanc'd, but rather gone backward. For before that Journey, the constant League was, to look for an Expedient for the 37th Article, and that all the others were allow'd. But from that Journey that Language began to change; some things were to be left out, others put in; the Form, which is the Life of 'em, as Articles, is taken away, and the whole new modell'd, and the Security is destroy'd, while the Execution, agreed on, is defer'd. This is all this interval produc'd, till just the end of it, when the old Language is again resum'd, and the only Point to be adjusted, in appearance, the 37th Article.

As this Management of France gave the States no good Opinion of their being sincere, they push'd the preparations of the Campaign with all the Vigour possible, and erected prodigious Magazines on the Frontier, that the Army might be able to take the Field early, and was in very pressing Terms to the Queen, that she wou'd please to send over the Duke of M—— if he cou'd be so soon, before the end of February, that they might have the Benefit of his Wise Counsels, as well as reap the Advantage of his incomparable Valour: This is the Language in which the States, who have had so much Experience of him, always speak of this great man; a sufficient Reason with some to undervalue him, who know nothing of themselves, but are taught to think whatever the Duke do must be wrong. But to go on, as the suspicions the French gave of their insincerity, made the States pursue most effectual Measures for an early Campaign; so it put them upon taking the best care they cou'd, that if any good shou'd come from the Renewing of the Conference they might prevent the Mischief they apprehended was sign'd by them. And therefore, tho' they gave leave to the Conferences to be renew'd, they wou'd not suffer the Ministers of France to come into the Heart of the Country, till the point in dispute shou'd be agreed. So the French pretended to except to nothing but the 37th Article, and said, they had an Expedient for that which they doubted not, wou'd give content: this being a fair, which, in all appearance, required but little time, and seem'd not to require many Conferences: the States propos'd, upon Nature being disslik'd, to send their Deputies

confer with the Ministers of *France*, either at *Adora*
or *Gertruydenberg*. The French lik'd neither of these
places, but when no other could be obtain'd, they chose
the last; where they arriv'd the 10th of March, but were
the day before by the Deposits of the States at *Mos-*
cow, where was held the first Conference: which suffi-
ciently shew'd, what slender hopes there were of any
good from them.

The Ministers of *France* were the Marquis d'Uselles
the Abbé de Polignac, Men extremely well qualify'd
the Business they came upon: And the Deputies on the
part of the States, were Messieurs Buys and Vanderdussen;
the same by whom the first Conferences with Monsieur
de Witt were manag'd the Year before; and who are known
to me, which I shou'd have mention'd in my last, to have no
objection to a Peace, if it cou'd be had on reasonable
terms. These Conferences, which were begun on March
19th, continu'd till July; on the 25th of which Month,
the French Ministers left *Gertruydenberg*. So that these
Conferences lasted more Weeks than they shou'd have
suffer'd to do Days; there being but one single
point, by their own Confession, in Dispute; which is
the only Fault that I believe any body can find in the
Management of this Affair; that the States had in the Management of this Affair;
they were as sensible themselves of it, as any body
cou'd be. They knew the Advantage the French made
by the stay of the Plenipotentiaries in *Holland*; which
contributed extremely to keep up the Spirits of the Peo-
ple in France, and make them bear patiently the conti-
nuance of the War, and the arbitrary and violent Methods
of the use of to support it. *Bread and Peace* was the cry of
the common People all over France, and the Court was
continually afraid of great Tumults in the great Towns,
and in the remoter Provinces; which made it necessary to
set them with the most specious Apparitions of Peace;
which they all along gave out was as good as made; and
by Express that arriv'd, the People were made to hope,
that they shou'd bring the welcome News, that the Articles were
settled. Nor were the French content to impose this on
their own People, their Embassies did the same thing in
Holland.

Netherlands; and 'twas by their means often very confidently reported, that all was agreed, when the *States* had no Interest in deceiving their People, gave themselves no occasion for their entertaining such false Hopes. This the French did, to make them insensibly grow weary of the War, and shew themselves out of Humour with their Governors; and that they might have the Odium of deceiving them, while themselves made their Uses of One of which was, to enable them to find Credit more easily at *Amsterdam*; where underhand, 'tis certain, great Sums of Money were negotiated; and sent in Specie *Bracons*; which an appearance of Peace very much facilitated, by the Hopes it gave of good Payment; and in the mean time, there was the Temptation of great Interest, and besides all the other Purposes, these reports of Peace served to, they hop'd it might make the States themselves less forward to supply the great Expence which a vigorous Siege calls for, and utterly averie to a Battle, which the French were most afraid of; and whenever the Conferences should end, the greater the Expectations had been of Peace, the more People would be dissatisfy'd at its going off; and the Fault would seem to be at least theirs, who had been loudest, and talk'd most for it. These Advantages the French in fact did make of the stay of the Plenipotentiaries at *Gertruydenberg*; and it was before hand easy to see they would: but the Remedy was not so easy. And therefore, tho' the States were sensible from the first Conference, that the wisest part they could take, was to send them back immediately, or limit the stay to a very short time; they did not only manage their Conferences by Deputies, who, as I have said, were no Inclination to Peace, but suffer'd the French to stay till there was not the least Pretence for more Conferences, or the *Paras* at least would make none, but were themselves willing to be gone. This the States thought themselves oblig'd to do, to prevent the Insinuations of the French, which were industriously spread by their Missionaries, as if the old Ministry, the Pensionary, and his Friends, were averse to Peace, and had a Design to perpetuate the War for their own Interest. This is

lumay has too much Influence on the Minds of the
 people in other Governments, to think, that great Care
 ought not to be taken to obviate the Force and Mischief
 of it in one that is wholly Popular. This was the Reason
 that determin'd the Dutch Ministry to let the Plenipo-
 tentiaries make so long a stay; for they too have their
 enemies, tho' not hitherto successful ones.

But to come to the Conferences themselves: The first
 was on March the 9th, at Moerdyke; in which, to show
 what might be expected from the rest, the Ministers of
 France, after all Assurances that had been given of the
 King's agreeing to those Articles which give up the
 whole Spanish Monarchy in the most ample manner, be-
 gan with proposing a Partition; and that Naples and Sicily
 with Sardinia, and the Towns upon the Coast of Tos-
 cany belonging to Spain, shou'd be granted to one of the
 competitors, without naming which: That since the Dutch
 wou'd not be satisfy'd with cautionary Towns in Flan-
 ders, no other Expedient was left but this; it being ve-
 ry hard to oblige the King to force his Grandson to quit,
 it being impossible to persuade him to it, without a valuable
 consideration. Tho' nothing cou'd be more exactly against
 the Preliminaries, than this Proposal of a Partition, the
 French did not wholly reject it, nor did the other side ab-
 solutely insist upon all they at first ask'd; which if they
 had, little had remain'd for them but to go back, it being
 impossible to think the Emperor wou'd ever consent to
 give up Naples, which wou'd give the French such
 an footing in Italy, as wou'd soon make them Masters of the
 whole, and endanger his Hereditary Country. The Mi-
 nisters of France were made so sensible of this, as to give
 up the Point, and say, They believ'd the King wou'd,
 for the sake of Peace, be prevail'd with to desist from
 that part of his Demands, towards which they promis'd
 to send good Offices: and so the first Conference ended.
 The Deputies return'd to the Hague, and the Plenipoten-
 tiaries sent an Express to the King, to let him know
 what had pass'd. Upon the return of the Express, the
 plenipotentiaries sent to the Hague, to desire another
 conference; which was agreed to, and the 20th the
 Deputies went a second time to confer with them: their

part in these Interviews having been concerted in the mean time with the Ministers of the Emperor and England at several Meetings for that purpose, and the rest of the Allies having been at a general Meeting informed of what had been mov'd in the first Conference. And this was the Constant way, in which these Negotiations were carry'd on while the Ministers of France continued at Gertruydenberg. At the end of a Conference they sent an Express to Court; and upon his Return perhaps the next day, perhaps two or three days after when they had decypher'd their Instructions, and settled matters between themselves, they notify'd it at the Hague and desir'd another Conference; which was agreed to. The Deputies went, confer'd, return'd, reported; upon which the Allies meet, consult, agree, and settle what further Steps should be made on their part.

The French on their side send an Express again to Court and so on. In this manner the Deputies went to a third Conference the 6th of April, and to a fourth the 23d. The main Point debated in these Conferences, was this Partition. And that no Obstruction to a General Peace on that foot on the part of England might arise from the Addition of the two Houses mention'd in my last, care was taken by the D. of M. and the late M—— that the Parliament should not be prorogu'd in the Spring as usually; but that the Session should be continu'd by short Adjournments till all hopes of Peace were at an End, that the Queen might have their Concurrence to agree to such a Partition, as they should think reasonable. The King of France was willing at last to recede from *Naples* being part of the Partition but insisted on the rest, and would by no means consent to quit the Towns on the Coast of *Tuscany*, which the Grandson had still possession of. And as he was unwilling to give up these, so the Deputies could not consent to part with *Sardinia*, which was already in the Emperor's possession. So that on the part of the Allies, the Deputies were unwilling to part with any thing of the Partition propos'd but *Sicily*, and the French would accept of nothing but *Naples*. The Allies were willing to give up something for a General Peace, and 'twas thought by

they were sincere, would be willing to take any thing. And thus the Allies had the more reason to expect, from the turn the Campaign was like to take: The Duke of M. Prince Eugene, who left the Hague the 14th, having sent the *Scarpe* without opposition the 20th, of which the States had the welcome News time enough for the Deputies to carry it with them to the Fourth Conference. This Success, which put France into a great Consternation, had in appearance no effect on them. They pretended they had no power to recede from their last Decisions, but would send to Court for further Instructions; which they were allow'd till the 18th of May. But they had no occasion, it seems, for so much time: Their Messengers came back the 3d, which was notify'd the 7th; the King still insisting, 'twas to no purpose to have the Conferences, which was signify'd to them by M.

Upon which they pretended to be very stiff, and declar'd they would leave *Gortynaburg* the 15th or 16th; and just was carry'd so far, that part of their Regiment and baggage was actually sent away. But this was all a feint: On the 15th came, an Express arriv'd very & proper, to the Appearance, and enable them to stay with a good success: which they notify'd the 18th, and the Deputies came to them the 23d. And in this Conference the King pleas'd to desist from the Towns on the Coast of Sicily, but adher'd to his Demand of Sicily and Sardinia.

And to remove the Objection against the last, a project had been some time forming to make a Defense on it, by getting into Possession; which design, when it was in a manner executed, was happily defeated by a part of the Fleet that were then going from Italy to Catalonia. At this point of the Partition being driven as far as it could go, 'twas now the Turn of the Allies to ask, supposing this Partition agreed to, that the Legions of the Spanish Monarchy, should be given to the Duke of Anjou, in such way the King propos'd they should have the rest of it to them: For the Reason the Allies insist'd on the Article, was, that they might have a General Peace, and not be involv'd in a separate War with Spain. This

was the Business of these Conferences, and there was Sense in the French pre-tending to demand a Partition upon any other Terms, but supposing the Allies would quit the one part of the Monarchy to the D. of Anjou, that he should quit the rest to them. 'twas to be understood, the King knew his Grandson's Mind upon this Head, and that he had either Authority from him to treat of a Partition, or that he had himself the Power in his Hands to oblige him to consent to it. But this the Plenipotentiaries could not speak fully to at this Conference; 'twas left to be the subject of the next, which was not held till June 16. For tho' that Express arriv'd the 6th, it was not notify'd till the 10th. By this time the French Court were pretty well out of pain for Arras, the Army having been some time assembled, and in such ground as would make it impracticable for the Allies to come either at them or the Town: and this probably had little share in regulating the Motions of the French Counsels, and the Instructions they sent to their Ministers, with whom the Deputies had on the 16th Conference from morning to night, upon this Capital Point, how the Allies should be put into possession of Spain and the Islands. To which the Answer was, That the King was willing to concert the proper measures with them, according to the fourth Article. But this the Deputies could not think sufficient: For this he was oblig'd to by the Plenipotentiaries, tho' the 37th had been struck out; besides it was inconsistent with a general Peace, which they all along insisted on, and would necessarily engage them in a Spanish War, which they had been treating of a Partition to prevent. But to understand their meaning distinctly, they desir'd them to explain themselves, what those Measures were, the King would come into: would he joyn his Forces to theirs, to oblige his Grandson to accept the Terms he should make for him? Why, perhaps he would. But in the discussing this point, they took care to start a thousand difficulties, to shew it impracticable; such as these how to settle what should be the whole Force employ'd to reduce Spain and the Islands; what share each should contribute; how they should jointly or separately; who should Command; how

and by whom their Instructions for acting should
 be made, and the like; and the same difficulties might
 be started for the Sea Service. Well, if these measures
 are impracticable, as no doubt they are where one Party
 designs to come heartily into them; what are those
 things which will come into? Why, he will contribute a
 certain Sum of Money towards the Expence the Allies
 will be at upon this occasion. How now will this mend
 the matter? How shall they be able to settle the Sum,
 and secure the payment? The first of these is a very dif-
 ficult Point, when it comes to be drawn out into particu-
 lars, and to be consider'd how hard it is to know the
 issue of such a War, how long it may continue?
 and where and at what time the Payments shall be
 made, and if a Sum certain can't be fix'd at first, who
 shall settle the Proportion France shall pay, or oblige them
 to be quiet in it?

But if those difficulties could be overcome, what security can
 be given for payment? A very pretty one indeed, is that
 the French offer'd, that the richest Bankers of Paris
 shall be bound for it. One would be glad to know, what re-
 medy the Allies could have against their Bankers in case of
 default, or how they can reach them. To take Paris it self,
 does not seem to me more difficult. But they are men of Ho-
 nour, and may be trusted. 'Tis true, and so they have been,
 in the King's Affairs have made the greatest of them Bank-
 rupts. But if they were men of ever so much Honour, or were
 so much concerned to support their personal Credit, in
 their own private Affairs, what is Honour or Credit against
 the will of State? where an Arbitrary Prince is pleas'd to in-
 terfere? which the King has, this Summer particularly, shown
 how to do; having for very great Sums taken the
 Credit of his Bankers on himself, and declar'd them his, and by
 this means has render'd all legal Remedies impossible. Before
 their Credit was better than the King's, but by being
 taken for him, it is sunk as low as his, and in effect become
 nothing, that is, no Credit at all. And is not this a rare
 thing for the Allies to trust, for the Payment of such Sums
 may be suppos'd to be the King's Share in the Charge of so
 long a War? And if Security could be given for a Sum
 of Money, what is this, but in effect to sell a part of the Spanish
 Monarchy,

Monarchy, for a Sum of Money, towards carrying on all which he will take care to render ineffectual.

Upon the Report which the Deputies made the 18th what had pass'd in this Conference: The Allies had several meetings to consider what should be the next step. From the Account the Deputies had given, that it was the purpose to think of concerting Measures with France for a war with Spain after a Peace made with them: What had said about both Troops and Money, evidently shew'd, that of that kind could be thought of, which France was not able to defeat, by the Difficulties with which they were to care to puzzle is; that all Proposals of this nature were only inconsistent with the End for which these Conferences resum'd, which was to find an Expedient for the 3rd Article, and obtain the thing design'd by the Preliminaries, which was a General Peace; but also contrary to what had at the beginning of them been suppos'd, upon the French proposing a Partition: which could mean nothing else, but that they were willing the Spanish Monarchy should eventually be divid'd up to the Allies, some part being taken out for the Duke of Anjou: That if there were in earnest the Force to compel the Duke of Anjou to it, which was not all probable, it ought to lie wholly on the King, since he from the beginning promis'd the Restoration of Spain and Indies, and had laid it down as the Foundation on which they were to treat; which left no room to doubt but the King knew he could by persuasion or Constraint oblige his Grandson to consent to it, since otherwise such a Promise have no other meaning in it, but from the beginning to impose on the Allies.

But however, if Force were necessary, they were oblig'd the Troops they had in Portugal and Catalonia should act in concert with the King's to obtain this within the two months, or such other time as should be agreed on. And whoever considers the Duke of Anjou's Dependence on France, will easily be satisfy'd, that if the King were sincere, and in earnest meant what his Ministers had all along promis'd in his Name, a small Force, and a very little time would be more than enough.

Upon these Considerations the Allies resolv'd to accept the Offer of Money they had made, because it suppos'd

particular Peace with France, and the Continuation of the War with Spain, which they could not consent to, for reasons given in the first Conference; and to demand of them to Explain themselves upon the Subject of the Evacuation of Spain and the Indies in favour of King Charles, agreeably to the Preliminaries, before the Allies should declare their Intentions with respect to the Partition; and that unless they did this, all further Conferences would be to no purpose.

This Resolution the Allies signify'd to the Ministers of France, in a Letter to them from Mr. Petkum, July, 8. which they declin'd giving a distinct Answer, but declar'd another Conference; which was accordingly held with them the 13th: in which the Deputies having explain'd fully the Sense of the Allies, and the Resolution sent them by Mr. Petkum, (not that it wanted any Explanation, tho the Plenipotentiaries had thought fit to say so to avoid giving a distinct Answer to it) they insisted on a like clear and full Explication on the part of France: and this being a home point, that left no room for Evasion. When they saw themselves thus press'd, they resolv'd to put the best Face they cou'd upon the Matter, and were pleas'd to call this peremptory Summons to explain themselves a formal Rupture of the Treaty; and that therefore nothing was left for them to do but to return home. The Deputies gave them time to send once more to Court, in which they desir'd there might be no delays, and so parted. The Express they sent to Versailles did not stay above two or three Hours, as if he had gone merely for form sake, and was back again at Gertruydenberg the 18th; which they notify'd the 21st with a long Letter to the Pensionary, in form of a Manifesto, and went themselves a way the 27th. This Letter I take for granted you have seen, it has been so often printed; and therefore need not tell you in this in it all the Art of a French Writer, and of an Able Minister; and that it is as well call'd one, as the Cause they are to defend, will admit: but if you have read this Letter, I cannot but suppose you have also read the Resolution of the States, July 27. in answer to it, which is writ with that Plainness and Sincerity,

cerity, it is so free from Disguise and Artifice, there is in it such solid Reasoning, so much good Sense, such a force of Truth, that a Man must be a very ill Judge, or have no very honest Mind, that can't see, or will not own, that the Integrity and Honour of the Allies is abundantly justifi'd and clear'd from the false Aspersions which the French Letter wou'd throw upon them; and that the ill Success of these Negotiations is intirely owing to those, who wou'd cast the blame of the Rupture upon them; it being exceeding plain, that the King of France has put it out of the Power of the Allies to make a general Peace, by refusing to give them Spain and the Indies, without which a good Peace can never be made, or the End for which we went into the War tolerably answer'd: and the more this Affair is examin'd into, the more you will be convinc'd of the Insincerity of the French, and the Necessity the Allies were under, to act as they did.

First, 'Tis indisputably true and confess'd on all hands, that the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, whatever became of the rest of the Monarchy, was promis'd from the very first; they did not pretend to desire so much as one single Conference for Peace on any other terms.

Now, if the King cou'd do what he promis'd, what becomes of the pretended Impossibility? And if he cou'd not, what cou'd he mean by such a Promise but to amuse and deceive? But if he design'd that, then it undeniably follows, all these Negotiations on his part have been one continued Cheat from the Beginning to the End. And that this is the Truth of the Case, I have given you many Proofs both in my last Letter, and in this. All the Expedients he propos'd, were so many Shams, and had no other meaning in them but to gain Time, quiet his People, and sow Jealousies among the Allies; and defeat if possible by a Treaty those he can't defeat by his Arms. What else cou'd he mean by proposing a Partition as an Expedient, and yet refusing to let it have the Effect of one. To ask the States to consent to a Partition, and not suffer them to ask for what, is a little too barefac'd. Could they think the *Dutch* wou'd consent to this Expedient for the sake of a General Peace, without being sure, a gene-

Peace wou'd be purchas'd by it? I scarce believe, they expected that of them; but nevertheless hop'd, they shou'd in their Ends by it; and that the very hearkning to the proposal of a Partition wou'd create Jealousies and divide the Allies, in which they did not judge very ill: for the conferences upon this foot very much alarm'd the Ministers of the Emperor and King *Charles*, who were utterly averse to a Partition of any kind; and it was with great difficulty they were prevail'd with to consent to let the conferences with the Ministers of *France* be manag'd by the Deputies of the States, without their being themselves present at them; which wou'd have rendred the Negotiations for a general Peace much more difficult than they were, tho' *France* had been in earnest for it. And this was all *France* aim'd at by proposing a Partition; some of the Allies, they knew, wou'd be extremely against it, while the States, they hop'd, wou'd, for so desirable an end, be willing enough to come into it; and this Difference they promis'd themselves much from: but for fear this Difficulty shou'd be overcome, and the Allies shou'd take them at their words, and accept some of the Expenses offer'd, they had another Resort being, by which they cou'd at any time confound all that had been done, and had great Hopes, at the same time, that the Alliance might be broke by it. And that was this; they pretended they cou'd not execute any part of the Preliminaries, unless the Allies wou'd oblige themselves not to make any further Demands, than what were already contain'd in the whole Articles, or that they shou'd be now declar'd: which is contrary to the 23^d Article, in which there is a power expressly reserv'd for the Empire, the four Associated Circles, the Kings of *Portugal* and *Prussia*, and the Duke of *Savoy*, to make what further Demands they shall find reasonable. Thus the *French* insist'd on, for no other reason but because they knew it was impossible for the Allies in justice to comply with it, unless the respective Powers above-nam'd had had Ministers at the *Hague* with full Instructions from each of them; which they knew they neither had, nor cou'd have without losing a great deal of time: Besides, this Demand of the *French* is contrary

crary not only to the exprefs Terms of the Preliminaries but to the very Nature of them; for if nothing is to be left to be adjusted at a general Treaty, how does a Preliminary Treaty differ from it? But it was very much for the Purpose of the French, who meant nothing but to amuse the Allies and make mischief, to insist on it; which accordingly they did, being sure which ever part the Allies took, they shou'd find their Account in it. For if the Allies would not agree to this Demand, then there was always a Handle ready to break off the Treaty upon; long as further Demands may be made upon them, they can't be sure, any Concessions will procure a lasting Peace, and they shall be in danger of having the War renewed upon them, after all they shall have done to put an End to it. And this is very plausible and specious; but as I shall shew you by and by, has at the bottom nothing at all in it. But if the Allies had comply'd with this Demand, and declar'd no further Demands shou'd be insisted on, what a fine Game wou'd the French have had. They had nothing else to do, to break the Alliance, but to represent to some of these Members of it, how their Interests were neglected, and what poor Terms the Maritime Powers and the Emperor have made for themselves.

You see, Gentlemen, the utmost your Allies ask for you; you see the whole you are to expect from them; these are the Terms they have made for you, and they have promis'd to observe to acquiesce in them: Are these Allies worth adhering to? Come over to the Interest of the King, and support his just Pretensions, and you will find both him and his Gratitude more grateful; you shall have this and that and a'other good thing, this Town, that Principality, so much Money, such a valuable March, in short, Terms infinitely more advantageous to your Masters, and the Interest of their Families, than anything the Allies will do for you. This Artifice the French saw the good Effects of the last War, and their Fingers itch to be gain as it; for this was the way they drew off a certain Frenchman, which was the ruin of that Confederacy; after which Embassadors had been for some time in Holland proposing the same Terms of Peace, and endeavouring to find, what the Principal Allies wou'd be content with for the re-

when they had learnt this, the Use they made of it, was to
 induce one of them, by offering much better Terms than had
 been ask'd for him; the Baie took, and 'twas agreed to leave
 that Side he thought himself ill us'd by; nothing remain'd but
 to contrive how this might be done most decently: the way a-
 greed on was to invade his Country with a great Army, and
 lay Siege to his Capital. What cou'd the unhappy Prince do
 in these Circumstances? he is in the utmost Danger, his Allies
 neither do nor can support him; there is no Safety for him but in a
 Peace. Thus a Member was brought off from the last Confede-
 ration; and the same Play they want to be again at. This is
 certain, that we are sure they were trying this very trick
 on the same Prince. While the Marquis de Torcy made at
 the Hague such mighty Difficulties in complying with the Terms
 demanded for the Duke of Savoy, whom he pretended his Ma-
 jesty had great Reason to be dissatisfy'd with; this false perfidi-
 cious Court was at that very time tempting him with better Of-
 fers at Turin; but that Prince understood his Interests too
 well to hearken again to them.

This is the Use the Ministers of France hop'd to make of this
 demand of theirs, if the Allies had been weak enough to
 have agreed to it; but they were not to be so impos'd on, nor
 wou'd they act in so arbitrary a manner, as to force any of
 their Allies to submit to Terms made against their Consent, or
 without their knowledge; and therefore cou'd not, by all the Ar-
 guments of France, be prevail'd with to preclude them from making
 such further Demands as they shou'd think reasonable. But to
 say they were sincere, they were willing to desist from all fur-
 ther Demands for themselves, according to the 31st Article; this
 they cou'd do, more in justice they cou'd no. And had the French
 been in earnest on their part, they wou'd without difficulty, have
 assist'd the Allies in this Point; for they cou'd not with any
 Colour of Reason believe, that when the Maritime Powers and
 the Emperor were satisfy'd, they wou'd renew the War at the
 end of two Months, or what other time shou'd have been agreed
 on for the sake of any further Demands on the part of the other
 Allies, which it wou'd not be very reasonable for France to
 demand of them. And therefore it can't be thought they meant any
 thing else by urging this Point, but to make mischief, and draw
 the Allies if they cou'd into a Snare; and if that did not suc-

ceed, that they might always have it in their Power to
off.

To reduce the whole Management of the French in this Affair under one short View; they press the Allies to an impossibility contrary to the Preliminaries, and complain at the same time of being press'd to an impossibility themselves, tho' the Allies demand nothing but what they themselves offer'd from the beginning, and the Steps they have taken in this Point are very extraordinary. First, Negotiations are broke off upon the single Point of the 37th Article; then an Expedient is offer'd of Cautionary Towns; then the Conferences are again desir'd to be renewed upon repeated Assurances of agreeing to all the other Preliminaries except the 37th; then, as what would solve all Difficulties, a Partition is propos'd, which is at last reduc'd to Sicily and Saraginesia. And what is all this for? Will they sign the Preliminaries, if this Partition be agreed to? by no means: they take the very asking of this Question for a plain Design on the Allies to break off the Conferences; and they who have given you before all the Preliminaries except the 37th Article and three cautionary Towns, now take it very ill, you will accept the Preliminaries, not only without that Article, but without any Cautionary Towns or other Expedient tho' Saraginesia and Sicily be taken out of them, without having for any more Security given than before, that Spain and the Indies shall be restor'd tho' the proposing a Partition cou'd not possibly have any other meaning in it: for it was propos'd as an Expedient, but for what? To leave the Allies where it stand, tho' no sure; but to remove the pretended Difficulty of evacuating Spain and the Indies, in favour of King Charles.

But if this be the plain meaning of this Proposal, how came the Treaty to break off upon this Point? What can be more unjust, than to desire the Allies to quit part of what the Preliminaries give them for the sake of the rest, and yet not tell them, which way the rest is to be had? What more ridiculous than to press the States to all the Inconveniencies, which the consenting to a Partition might be attended with, without allowing them the least Advantage from it? How can one reconcile the asking a Partition at the beginning of the Conferences, and the breaking them off, because the Allies desire to be secure of the Effect propos'd from it?

Now after all that has been said upon this Subject, can there be any doubt which Side is in fault, or a whose it lies that these Conferences did not succeed? One would think, without entering into the Merits of the Cause, shou'd in this case believe our Friends rather than Enemies; and not be in the least at a loss, to know where to lay the Fault, that these Negotiations were broke off, especially considering the part the Allies acted, and what they all readily concurr'd in. Such Friends in a Case, and when so unanimous, ought surely to be credited, by those at least who are not themselves competent Judges of the Matter; and even they that are, ought to be very sure of the Goodness of their Reasons before they presume to dissent from them, much more before they censure them: and if we all think our selves so wise, that we will be using our own Judgments, yet sure more credit will be allow'd to such, so many and so faithful Friends, who are embark'd with us in the same Interest, than to Enemies, the worst of Enemies, the basest, falsest, most trickish, most perfidious Court under Heaven: for that the French Court is and has been time out of mind. That even in a disputable Case, which this is far from being, 'twou'd be absurd to credit them before our Friends, especially in an Affair, where 'tis of the utmost Importance to them to deceive; and therefore all the Words they use, be they ever so solemn, ought not upon their credit to have any weight with us. The grand Project of a Universal Monarchy is now upon the point of being finish'd or destroy'd; 'tis now at its crisis; one or other must in a little time be the Fate of it: and can we think they will stick at saying any thing, true or false, to prevent the ruin of it? No: what they will or will not do to secure their Project, now they have brought it to such a Point, you can't better judge than by seeing what they cou'd bring themselves to do for the sake of it in its Infancy; when it was but just thought of, and then hardly seem'd practicable. There is, in the Memoirs of the Treaty of Munster lately publish'd, so remarkable an Instance of this, as shou'd deter a Man as long as he remembers it from giving credit easily to any
 Affeверations

Asseverations whatsoever of a French Minister, when
 for the Interest of his great Master, to which all
 Faith and Sincerity must bend. There must be no squa-
 mish kind of Honour; no Integrity must be inflexible;
 'tis the King, he must be obey'd, and nothing must
 boggled at that is for his Service. The Case was this
 The Union of France and Spain was a Project Cardinal
 Mazarin was extremely fond of; and to facilitate the
 he hop'd at the Treaty of Munster to get from Spain
 the Low Countries, which he propos'd to do two ways
 First, To have them in Exchange for Catalonia; which
 the French had taken from the Spaniards in the War they
 were then endeavouring to put an end to. Secondly,
 by way of Dowry upon a Marriage of the Infanta with the
 King. This Design the Cardinal was so full of, that it
 meets with it in almost all his Instructions and Letters
 to the French Plenipotentiaries from one end of the Mem-
 moirs to the other; and he had endeavour'd to draw the
 Prince of Orange into it, upon a Promise of the Marquis
 of Antwerp. This Matter some how or other took Air and
 alarm'd the States extremely, who were then in League
 with France. Their Plenipotentiaries at Munster com-
 plain'd of it to the Ministers of France, who protest
 nothing of that kind had ever been propos'd to them
 the Spaniards. But this did not satisfy the States; the
 Year after, 1647. one of their Ambassadors, Mons. Se-
 vien, went to Holland, and to allay the Jealousies and
 Fears this Affair had given the States, he protests there
 nothing in it, in a manner the most solemn that can be
 imagin'd; he writes a Letter in April, about six Weeks
 after the Prince of Orange was dead, to each of the Pro-
 vinces, and therein tells them, that as to the pretended
 Treaties of Marriage or Exchange, 'tis so gross an In-
 vention (*une fourbe si grossiere*) that there is no Man
 who understands any thing of Affairs, but must know
 wou'd be as great Imprudence as Perfidiousness to hearken
 to any such Propositions; and tho there be no room
 for them to doubt of the Assurances which the King
 Ministers had already given them, yet says he, I pro-
 test a-new to your Lordships upon my Life and my
 Honour

honour, that they are Falsities, maliciously invented by the Enemy; and I submit my self to lose both, if on the part of France any ear has been given to any thing of this kind, or any Negotiation has been enter'd into. After so solemn a Declaration, the good Ambassador thinks but just, that the Authors of this Imposture shou'd be punish'd in an exemplary manner, for daring to attack with their Calumnies the Faith and Reputation of a great King. And have we not great Reason to take the same word of a Minister of France, when they are our Enemies who cou'd deceive in this solemn manner those whom at that time they were in League with? Others may have a good Opinion of French Faith if they please, and think the Protestations of Torcy or Polignac of more weight, than what a whole Congress of our Allies tell us; for my part, I shall always remember Servien, who had this scandalous part not as Servien, but as the Ambassador of France, for the same King, and for the same Cause, we are now treating with and guarding against. There is nothing so false, I can't think this Prince and his Ministers capable of, that can help them to give the finishing Stroke to their Project, when they cou'd violate their Faith in so infamous a manner, to give the first Beginnings to it. And I confess 'tis a great Surprise to me, that I think we shou'd not in this be all of the same Mind. But some Men, it seems, were in so much haste for Peace, that they cou'd not bear the Disappointment; they had work to be done, that wou'd not stay; and yet they wou'd not without a Peace conveniently be carry'd on. The want they had of a Peace made them too easily believe there wou'd be one; and their impatience to be doing wou'd not let them wait till they cou'd be sure: they were so fond of their leap, that they were resolv'd to take it in the dark; they find themselves plung'd so deep, they don't know which way to turn themselves, or how to get out, and then are angry there is not a Peace, and wou'd fain lay the Fault on others right or wrong, to excuse what they have brought upon themselves. In truth there was a very great Dilemma these Gentlemen were under: it was very much for their Purpose, to have the Ferment

the

the Nation is in, and a Peace, no matter what sort one, come both together. The Ferment they are in possession of, the Peace is a little doubtful; what shall they do? if they stay for a Peace, which would be very convenient for them, they may lose the Ferment for nothing that is so violent can last: On the other hand if they take the advantage of the Ferment, they may lose the Peace. Well, 'tis resolv'd to venture, if they lose one 'tis but ruining the Nation: whereas losing the other would be the ruin of themselves. When that is the Dilemma 'tis no great wonder such Men shou'd choose the side they have; Self weighs more with them than a whole Nation whom they vainly think they cannot only make blind but keep so, and hope to Screen themselves from their Remorsement by setting them upon those who never do them any harm, but have steddily pursu'd their true Interests.

But if a Nation can't see, they can't feel; and some time may come, when they, who are now so angry with the late M—— that there is no Peace, may find it more than they can do, to excuse themselves for bringing the Nation into a necessity of submitting to an ill one. When People have been long well in their Affairs, they may contract such an Insensibility of the good Condition they are in, as to be persuaded they are ill; but when their Affairs go very ill, 'tis not in the power of words to make them believe they go well; and there's nothing can prevent this, nothing can save the Nation from the dangers some Men would bring it into, and them from what they deserve for it, but the unshaken Constancy, and unwearied Endeavours of those very Men, whom they daily load with the blackest Calumnies, and treat in so barbarous a manner, as if they never thought they could be us'd ill enough.

But to return to the Rupture of the Conferences; plain they broke off, because the French would not procure to the Allies the Restoration of *Spain* and the *Indies* and 'tis as plain, the French ought to have done this 'tis what they promis'd from the beginning, and undertook for at the opening of those Conferences, the Proposal of a Partition being incapable of any other fair Construction.

tion : and therefore the blame of the Rapture can
 only up on the French, or on those who have encour-
 d them to act thus, by discovering the mighty haste
 ey were in for Peace. For whether the French, when
 y first began these Conferences, intended they shou'd
 d as they did, may possibly be a question. I must own,
 en I heard they had propos'd a Partition, I thought
 e necessity of their Affairs had at last forc'd them to
 sincere, and that they wou'd have struck up a Peace
 ore Downy was taken, that the Allies might not ex-
 d their Conquests beyond the bounds of their Prelimi-
 ies. And perhaps, even after this they might balance
 th themselves, and were for some time irresolute, with
 antion to consent, or not consent to the Allies, as they
 nd themselves press'd by the War. And cou'd the
 of M—— have either beat their Army, or besie-
 d Arras, I believe they wou'd have thought, the King
 ht with Honour have abandon'd his Grandson, after
 had sacrific'd so much for the Support of him ; and
 safety of France wou'd have excus'd to all the World
 quitting Spain : And it was with this view principal-
 they kept their Ministers so long at Geertruydenberg,
 t they might be upon the spot, to clap up a Peace im-
 mediately, if there shou'd be occasion. By this they were
 e to have an Advantage in case of a Battle, which
 er way it turn'd ; for if they lost it, they wou'd have
 n able to prevent the fatal Consequences of a great
 fear, by closing with the Terms of the Allies, before
 ictory cou'd be pursued ; and if they had won it, they
 u'd have made use of the first Consternation, which
 los of a Battle wou'd have put the Dutch into, to
 ss them to a Peace in their Terms. That this was the
 st the French meant by these Conferences, is evident
 n what was doing at the same time in Spain. I have
 erv'd before, that either the Spaniards or we must be
 eiv'd ; and therefore the French kept it in their Pow-
 y by the most artful Ways they cou'd, to do either as
 y found most convenient ; but that the King's Incl-
 on and Interest were too well known, to leave room
 ouble, that he wou'd keep his Promise to the Spa-
 ds, if he cou'd. Accordingly we see, he did not only
 enable

enable his Grandson, as I have observ'd before, to put *Spain* into the best Posture of Defence 'twas capable of, and supply him with every thing that was necessary; he promis'd to make the Siege of *Gironne* early in the Spring, and was making a new Offensive and Defensive Treaty with him, during these very Conferences. And the assistance and assurances the D. of *Anjou* had given him, made him think of nothing less than quitting *Spain*. In the Spring he pretended to have an Army of 122 Battalions, and 145 Squadrons; besides the Troops that were coming to him from *Flanders*. Before the Conference begun, the King receiv'd an Express from his Grandson to acquaint him with the Zeal the *Casilians* express'd to him, and his Resolution to stand by them; and the French Minister at *Madrid* in April gave out, that the Conferences were broke off. At the same time the D. of *Anjou* was hastning to put himself at the Head of his Army, but was stop'd by the Affair of the D. de *Medina* which, as great a Mystery as it is, was probably at bottom a French Trick. 'Twas very natural for the Spaniards to take Umbrage at the Conferences, and to think it was time to take care of themselves; and that if they shou'd in earnest abandon them, 'twas to no purpose for them to adhere to his Grandson. To feel their Pulse upon this point, 'tis probable the French Ministers, either *Belcour* or *l'abberville*, or some others of their Emissaries pretended to treat with some of the *Grandeas* upon a private Foot, and acquainted them that the King's Affairs would not permit him to support his Grandson any longer, that the King did not expect they shou'd ruin themselves to maintain him on the Throne, since in that case it would be impracticable; but that if they would dispose him to resign, the King would endeavour to get some Partition for him. 'Tis extremely probable, this Trick was contriv'd at *Madrid*, to find how the *Grandeas* were inclin'd to act on this occasion; the Duke de *Medina* in particular who was the first Minister; and that when they got out of him the Sense of him and his Friends on this nice Subject, the use they made of it, was to bring him to the D. of *Anjou*: and possibly the thing went farther, and that in concert with the *French*, to save the

ing's Honour, they had agreed to seize his Person and
 ay him off; which I remember was the first Report
 e had, upon that Minister's Disgrace. After this Af-
 r was over, which had sufficiently intirened the Spa-
 ards, the D. of Anjou left *Madrid*, and join'd his Ar-
 y near *Lerida*. And the D. de Noailles was advanced
 the Banks of the *Ter*, the River *Gironne* stands upon, to
 our his Designs. In *June*, the D. of Anjou was so fati-
 ine, that he made no doubt of being able to drive
 ng *Charles* out of *Catalonia* that Campaign, especially
 the D. de Noailles cou'd but make the Siege of *Gironne*:
 his appears at large in some Letters of his that were
 ercep'd, to the King and the Duke of *Burgundy*, writ
 Congratulate the Marriage of the Duke of *Beary*, which
 shews himself not at all pleas'd with. Upon his Dis-
 pointment in *Catalonia*, when he could neither attack
 ateschal *Staremberg*, nor besiege *Balaguer*, he grew dis-
 isfy'd with his *Spanish* Generals; and in *July* both
 and his Princesses sollicit the King in very pressing terms,
 send the Duke of *Vendome* to him; which was soon
 mply'd with, and that the D. might have no appre-
 hensions of the King's designing to abandon him, he en-
 d into a new Alliance with him. This Alliance was
 ming while the Ministers of France were at *Gertruy-
 berg*, which place they left but the 25th; and the 8th
 August, or before, the Articles of this new Treaty were
 own publickly at *Paris*: which makes it plain to a
 monstration, that this Treaty was forming before the
 conferences were broke off.

From this Account 'tis exceeding evident that the French
 re taking the most effectual Methods to support the Duke of
 ou, and make the Spaniards faithfull to him, while they
 e persuading the Allies, the King would in earnest aban-
 him, and give him no assistance directly or indirectly; may
 le they were making terms for him, upon which they would
 ge him to resign and if this be not sincere in the last De-
 e, I would be glad to know, what it is. If he was sincere,
 did he treat for a general Peace, when he either would
 nor could not make the necessary Conditions of it practica-
 Why, when he meant nothing but a separate Peace, did he
 not

not frankly from the beginning tell the Allies, that he was willing to make Terms with them for himself, but that he could make none for Spain? Was this for any thing else but to amuse the Allies, who he knew would flatly have refus'd entering into any Negotiations, if he had spoke out plainly what he meant? Did not he intend from the beginning, to defeat by an Exception, a general Peace, while he pretended all the while to be for it? as old Managers sometimes do with a Bill in parliament, which they contrive should be lost by an Amendment, while they would be thought zealous for it; which they would not have been able to effect, had they openly declar'd against the Bill it self. Thus they gain the Point they would have, seeming to be for, what in truth they would not have; and on the same Part the King of France has acted with respect to Peace, but not yet with the same Success. He has not got yet what he wants, I mean a separate Peace, by affecting to treat for a General one; which he would of all things keep off. A Man must shut his Eyes very hard, not to see the French meant nothing by these Conferences but to amuse the Allies, and keep in their power to make what use of them they should have occasion for; and that they never design'd to consent to what was necessary to make a General Peace practicable: They either meant no Peace at all, or only a separate one for themselves; which he hop'd from the Temper of the Dutch, the Nature of their Government, and the Experience they have formerly had of them might be frighten'd into: To which end they affect'd from the very first Conference, to let nothing fall from them that might look like a Desire to retard the Operations of the Campaign on their own Part threaten'd what mighty things they would do upon the Rhine and in Spain; and to intimidate them the Maréchal Villars condescended to the mean Artifice of writing the French Ministers, from time to time, Letters filled with the grossest Gasconade, what a brave Army he had; how glorious they were to come to an Engagement, and that if the Allies had a mind to a Battle, they should meet with no Intermittents, but should find him ready to receive them in an open plain. These poor Tricks they fancy'd would pass upon the Deputies: But they were too well known to be believ'd; and the Event shew'd there was nothing else in all these Bores aim'd at, but to deceive: for the minute Downy began to

late, the Mareſchal retired to ſafe ground, and intrenched
 with all his might, and dar'd not offer them Battle all the reſt
 of the Campaign, tho' more Battalions had been weaken'd by the
 ſieges of Doway and Bethune, than the Battle of Blenheim
 was fought with; and almoſt as many more were afterwards
 the ſame time employ'd in the Sieges of St Venant and Aire.
 Theſe and all the other Artifices of France cou'd not delude
 the States to quit the common Intereſt, or induce the
 King to hearken to a ſeparate Peace with the French, who they
 ſaw, were taking the moſt effectual means to make the Reduc-
 tion of Spain impoſſible, while they were treating of Terms for
 Surrender of it. But nothing can diſcover more plainly the
 Sincerity of France, than what happen'd after theſe Confe-
 rences were ended: Two Days after their Plenipotentiaries
 were gone, the Duke of Anjou receiv'd a conſiderable Diſgrace
 at Almenara, and in about three Weeks after that his Army
 was entirely Deſeated at Saragoſſa, beyond a poſſibility of main-
 taining his Ground, or recovering his Affairs without the Affi-
 ance of France. Here now was a fair Occaſion for the French
 King to ſhew himſelf; his Language had been all along, that
 he wou'd not be active to deſtroy his Grandſon, but would con-
 ſultably to abandon him, if that would procure a Peace.
 The Allies can't take his bare Word; his Miniſters make the
 ſolemn Profeſſions in his Name, and give repeated Af-
 ſurances of this in the moſt expreſs Words, and complain be-
 cauſe that they are not believed. Now in leſs than a Month after
 theſe conferences were ended, there happens the beſt Opportunity in
 the World for the King to ſhew his great Sincerity, the Obſtru-
 ction to a Peace, is the Evacuation of Spain. Let now the King
 keep his Word, and be paſſive only, and the thing will do it
 ſelf: The Allies can't fail of Spain, if the King does not ſup-
 port his Grandſon againſt them. What part now does the
 King take? Does he ſend to the Allies that he will abandon
 his Grandſon in Earneſt, if that will content them? Nothing
 but: he ballances indeed for ſome time what to do, and
 frequent Councils; but for what? Not becauſe he has
 any doubt, whether he ſhou'd act agreeably to his Word, or
 not: he is ſincere: for that I have already obſerv'd he cou'd
 not; he muſt deceive either us or the Spaniards. All the
 therefore was, which he ſhou'd do: at firſt their Affairs
 ſeem'd

seem'd to be in so desperate a Condition, as to be beyond retrieval; and that all the Support he cou'd give his Grandson wou'd be insignificant; and therefore, there were some thoughts of making a Virtue of Necessity, and to procure a Peace to France, abandoning Spain, since, if he did not abandon it, it must be lost. And had the Action of Saragossa happen'd a Month sooner, it's very likely it had prov'd so; for the Hands of the French were too full of other Work to send any considerable Force to Spain, till the Campaign was in other parts, Savoy particularly, drawing to an end. After many Consultations, it was resolv'd to make the utmost Efforts to support the Duke of Anjou notwithstanding all their Pretences to leave him to himself, rather to persuade him to quit a Kingdom which, without their Help, all the World sees he cou'd not have kept.

What succe's this Assistance, that has been given him has had, I need not tell you; nor what further mischief the common Cause is like to suffer from it. 'Tis great pity the Conferences did not last one Month longer, which wou'd have put the French under a Necessity of keeping their Word, or in the most infamous manner breaking it, to support a Cause they had so often, and with so much seeming Earnestness, promis'd to renounce. As it is, there is but one Excuse for them, which those who are arguing against, had rather shou'd not be made; and that is, to plead that the Case is alter'd, Affairs are not in the same Condition they were in, when they made the Promises. They have a Political Observatory at Paris, where the Marquis de Torcy, and the French Ministers frequently examine what Appearances there are in the Heavens of all the Countries in War with them, and according to these they take their Measures of War or Peace; and 'tis by this they justify their Assisting the Duke of Anjou. What pass'd in Spain the 20th of August, they thought sufficiently ballanc'd by what happen'd to the North-West of them the 19th. What preceded that Phenomenon, and has since follow'd it, has determin'd the French not only to support the Duke of Anjou, but to abstain for the present from all further Offers of Peace, which we are as much plung'd into the War as we were seven Years ago, and there seems no remedy for it but

at is worse than the Disease, an ill Peace. For the truth of which I shall refer you to your own Reflections upon all the News we have had for these four Months past from Paris, and to what is as good a Proof as all the rest, to a Letter of the Elector of Bavaria's Minister to the Master, a Piece of which you have in the MEDLEY the first of this Month; which some People wou'd be apt to prove, is not so genuine as they know it is. Some People indeed wou'd still pretend to put a good Face on the Matter, and do not question from the D— of ——— past Successes, that he will yet frighten our Enemies into an honourable Peace. But I must beg their Pardon, if I can't be of their Opinion. I am afraid he is not likely to do so much at this time, when the Enemy is encourag'd to take heart afresh, the Allies are full of jealousies and Fears, and himself extremely mortify'd; things are not the same, any more than the Usage he meets with: When he is uneasy in his Thoughts, undetermined in the Favour of his Sovereign, and vilely misrepresented to the People; when his want of Interest at home makes it impossible for the Allies to depend on the hopes he gives them; when he is without Authority and his Army, where 'tis made criminal to espouse his Interests, and to fly in his Face is the surest means to Advancement; when 'tis meritorious in his Officers to cabal against him, and the most factious will be thought the most deserving. With what heart can a Man in these Circumstances serve? Or what Success can be expected from him, when he is to depend upon profess'd Enemies for his support? 'Tis little, I think, we can hope for even from him hereafter, tho' that little be more than any body else wou'd do.

But 'tis time to draw to a Conclusion of this Argument, in which I have said so much, that I flatter myself I may be allow'd, not as a Favour but common Justice, to conclude from it, That nothing can be more false and groundless than the malicious Aspersions of these Men, who without the least regard to Truth, Honour or good Conscience, tell the World that the D— of M— in conjunction with the late Ministry, was for perpetuating the

the War. If they shou'd describe the D— of M— to be a short, black, fattish, red-fac'd, ill-shap'd Man that loves to drink hard, never speaks to be understood, is extremely revengeful and ill-bred; if they shou'd present his Mind to be a Complication of all ill Qualities, and his Body to be the Image of Deformity, 'twould be as like him as the Picture those Gentlemen draw him. Nothing can be more ridiculous and absurd, than to accuse of a Design to perpetuate the War, a Man who in every respect out-gone our Wishes, and has done more towards a good Peace, by his own Conduct, Address and Ability, both in War and Peace, by his Conduct in the Field, by his Interest with the Allies, by his happy Temper to prevent or make up Differences, by his Dexterity and Wisdom, by his great Humanity and Sweetness of Behaviour which is peculiar to him, by his Zeal for the Honour of the QUEEN, whom he has serv'd with more Affection than most Men ever did a Mistress; and by his true Concern for the Good of his Country, and the Liberty of Europe, in which he has few Equals. By these admirable Qualities, which so eminently shine in him, he has done more towards a good Peace than all those that find fault with him, ever did or will do, put them all together: he has struck such a Terror into the Enemy, and preserv'd so perfect a Harmony among our Allies, that nothing, humanly speaking cou'd have destroy'd our Hope of a good Peace, but the Endeavours that have been us'd to destroy him. What Villany then was it to try by Calumnies and Lyes to ruin him, who cou'd not sink without drawing the Ruin of the Nation along with him? And 'tis that Consideration makes me express my self with so much warmth. For as for the Duke himself, he defies the feeble Efforts they make against him; their Malice may add to his Glory, by giving fresh Matter for him to shew the World how great a Man he is under all Tryals, but can lastingly take nothing from it: for Time will dissipate the thickest Mists with which his Glory may be overcast, and the malicious Attacks of Envy and Faction may very soon turn upon themselves; and at worst Posterity will be just, and his Name will be immortal and live for ever.

Esteem, while the Writers of Scandal, and their Masters are either bury'd in Oblivion, or remembered with Injury and Detestation. 'Tis not therefore the Person of Duke of M—— I'm concern'd for; but for the connexion which the Fate of this poor Nation, of our Isles, of all Europe, has with his. 'Tis the Prospect of ill Peace after so glorious and successful a War, and dismal Train of Consequences which such a Peace will bring with it: 'tis this disturbs me; and 'tis indeed this, not only this, disturbs him: for were the Glory of the Crown secur'd, and the Safety of his Country fix'd by a safe and honourable Peace, what could be so desirable to him as to retire and leave the Theatre of Business to others, who want so much to have it all to themselves, and that he were gone off of it? In which, he would before now have prevented their Impatience, if the publick Service did not want him: but such is the hard Fate of this great Man, that they can neither bear his Company, nor do without him; they know not how to let him either leave his Command, or continue in it: If he had left it, then with loud Mouths they wou'd have thrown the Odium upon him, which they dare not take upon themselves, and all the Effects of their own ill Man-gement wou'd have been laid upon him, as if his quitting had been the sole cause of all; and we shou'd have heard nothing but Invektive and Complain of his Ingratitude to his Queen and Country, for such ample Acknowledgments as they have made of his Services. But how base and unjust is this? for with what comfort can he continue in a Command under a suspicion of doing his Country service, when all possibility of serving well is taken from him? When nothing is left him that can make a General be obey'd or lov'd? What encouragement can he have to venture upon any great Enterprise, when he is sure all Success will be made a Crime, and good Success from him they had rather be without? What Service then is it they pretend to expect from him? Or what do they mean, by seeming desirous he should continue in his Command? I tremble with Indignation as I write to think how strangely some Men act, who would confound all things to serve themselves, and

can bear no Vertue, that stands in the way of their Designs; be it never so useful to the World, or be the Interest of their Country never so closely interwoven with it. But they tell us, we need be in no Pain for our Country. There is a certain Set of Men, the Oracle of the Party says, they are sure will use all proper Means to promote a safe and honourable Peace. Will they? I know no more, let but the Event make good their Words, and I'll forgive them all the rest. But what Means are they to be, or what Peace are we to expect from them? What these Means will be from these Words I can't guess, but I can tell you what they will not be; they must not be such as have been already us'd, for this is said in opposition to those who were for perpetuating the War. Not the Means they us'd, who are accus'd of this, were these they kept things quiet at Home, took the most effectual Methods to support Credit, carry'd on the War with Vigour, and maintain'd a good Correspondence with our Allies, that the common Enemy might find no room for Jealousies or make Divisions. Quiet, Unity, Credit, Vigour, Harmony, these were the Means the last Ministry us'd to perpetuate the War: I leave you then to judge what Means those must be, that we are now told will be in Opposition to these, be us'd to put an End to it.

But I'll venture to foretel thus much of them, that no proper means they can't use, no nor so proper, unless they condescend to use the same; and the same if they had a mind to use, they can't, 'tis too late, they are not to be had. What then are we to expect, should be the end of such improper means? Or how shall we come to a Safe and Honourable Peace, if the means they use, be contrary to those that have been already us'd, we can have no Peace, none that is safe and honourable: For let them remember, no Peace is so, without Spain and the Indies. Either the Queen and Parliament and Nation, and the whole Body of the Allies, have been these Nine years mightily in the wrong, who think these necessary to a good Peace; or they are so, who think any Peace can be good without them. Let them remember, 'tis all one whether ever way we suffer France to keep Possession, whether by formal Treaty, or by a separate Peace; which can hardly

these two Consequences, to bring the whole
 weight of a Spanish War upon England and be-
 last forc'd to quit what we have been at so
 great an Expence of Blood and Treasure so many
 years contending for; as I have shewn you at
 length in my last Letter. And that is not the
 worst of it: If we give Spain and the Indies
 to the King of France, he will be sure to give
 us as good a thing for it, a Prince bred from
 a Cradle in Bigotry and Tyranny; Italian
 Bigotry; and French Tyranny, the two great
 Plagues under the Sun; Plagues we de-
 serve to suffer if we think them none, or re-
 pent of the Pains we have been at to keep
 them out. This will infallibly be the Conse-
 quence of leaving Spain and the Indies to
 France; not perhaps presently; unless it be
 contriv'd to make it an Article in the next
 Treaty, which 'tis very easy to bring about
 in an ill War; but 'tis all one, if it be deferr'd
 a little, till the French have taken Breath,
 and are at leisure, after finishing their own vast
 Designs, to take care of us; for whom they
 have always had a particular regard, and will
 be the first good Opportunity to ruin us:
 For the Pretender, no doubt, will remember
 King James's dying Advice, never to quit his
 Religion, and always to look on the King of
 France as his Father. And I hope we shall al-
 ways remember, his Father gave him that Ad-
 vice, which is utterly inconsistent with our

Civil and Religious Rights; and if it take place, can end in nothing but the Ruin of this Nation. If not to come into such a Peace, be to perpetuate the War, may it still be perpetuated: If such Means and such an End, be meant by the proper Means to promote a just and honourable Peace; I don't wonder, they can't like the D--- of M----- they must find another General, and another Plenipotentiary, since he will never be for their turn. He has gain'd too much Honour by the War, and espous'd too far the true Interest of his Country, to promote an ill Peace, or make way for it by an ill War; and if nothing else can please these Gentlemen, will never purchase their Favour and Applause, at the Expence of his own Glory and the Nation's Safety; to say nothing of the common Cause, which nothing will prevail with him to betray. But I should never have done, if I were to go whither the Pursuit of these Reflections would lead me. I shall therefore, without saying more, content my self with having prov'd my Point, which I hope I have done, to the Satisfaction of any one, who knows enough of Affairs to judge of them, and is honest enough to be impartial; such a Man I know you to be, who will, I make no doubt, own your self convinc'd, that nothing can be more groundless than the Calumnies that have been thrown upon the D--- of M----- and his Friends, that the War has been ill manag'd,

order to perpetuate it. If what I have said
 true, nothing can be more unjust and absurd,
 these Imputations. And I shall content
 self with having shewn this, without en-
 ring what can be the meaning of all those
 icious Lyes, who they come from, what
 pose they are design'd to serve, or what
 Offence the D--- of M--- has given these
 n; since the things they pretend to accuse
 of, are all Chimerical and Imaginary. But
 atever it be they mean, 'tis the D-- of M--'s
 ppiness under all these Disadvantages to serve
 Queen, who knows how to put a juster Va-
 on the Zeal and Conduct he has shewn for
 Support and Honour of her Reign; who
 ws, that while 'tis her Pleasure, and for her
 vice he shou'd command, he will in spite,
 d I may add in contempt of the Use which
 ne Men prepare to make of a Peace, pursue
 the most effectual manner he can, the great
 vances he has made towards it.

I have nothing more to add, but to assure
 u, that to the best of my Knowledge, I
 ve said nothing that is not true, nor con-
 al'd any thing that is, which cou'd give
 ight to this Subject. I have made no wilful
 mistake in any part, much less any material
 e in what concerns the main questions: as
 any little Inaccuracies, especially in what
 ates to the Negotiations, considering the
 Se-

Secrecy they have been manag'd with,
 that I write from a place, where I have
 help either from papers or Conversation,
 shall hope to find an easy pardon from y
 since if these papers prove nothing else, I
 sure you will allow they prove this, that I
 with the greatest Truth, and most per
 Esteem,

S I R.

Your most faithful

humble Servant

FINIS.